Six things to know about the EU’s decision on top jobs

In the wake of the appointment of Donald Tusk as president of the European Council and Federica Mogherini as foreign policy chief, Tim King offers two declarations on the present state of EU politics; two reflections on the past; and two predictions for the future.

Declaration (1): The grand coalition rules, OK.

The two-fold decision was another triumph for the grand coalition of the parties of the centre-right and centre-left that has been extended from the German government in Berlin into the EU’s institutions in Brussels.

The centre-right European People’s Party, having secured the appointment of their candidate, Jean-Claude Juncker, to the presidency of the European Commission, accepted that the choice of the high representative would fall to the centre-left Party of European Socialists. That the person chosen was Federica Mogherini is chiefly a reflection of the pre-eminence of Matteo Renzi within the PES. Renzi almost messed things up in July – he misjudged the extent of the doubts about Mogherini and thought he could impose his will on the European Council. That the Mogherini candidacy was rescued owes something to Herman Van Rompuy’s skills and also to a re-assertion of the grand coalition’s dynamics.

A Tusk candidacy for the presidency – long whispered about, though often in tones of disbelief – was sufficiently important to the EPP to guarantee their co-operation with the PES on the counter-balancing the Mogherini candidacy. Note that the liberals, whatever their importunate claims, have been left empty-handed for the moment, though they will be hoping for sops in the distribution of Commission portfolios.

A reckless short-term prediction (1): Approval for European commissioners will be smoother than in the recent past.

The strength of the grand coalition will be viewed with satisfaction by Juncker. The chances of him getting his line-up for the college of European commissioners approved by the European Parliament are much better if the parties of the grand coalition are marching in step.

The signs are that the main parties will now seek to push through approval of the nominated commissioners without the usual ritual lynching. It may even help that Van Rompuy’s delays have put the Parliament’s confirmation hearings under time pressure, if the Commission is to start as planned on 1 November.

What will matter most will be the number of women nominated. Mogherini’s appointment keeps open the possibility that Juncker can put forward a college with nine women.

Reflection on the past (1): Last time round was worse.

The decision made by the European Council on Saturday night on the European Union’s top jobs was a vindication of Van Rompuy’s tactics. Van Rompuy decided back in mid-July that discussion of the appointments was not ripe for a decision and he convened an extra summit – for a Saturday at the end of August.

Back in July, it looked messy – not least because it upset the schedule for approval of the next European commissioners – but time has proved Van Rompuy right. At the weekend the government leaders approved the joint ticket of Tusk and Mogherini without great difficulty. The ground had been well prepared beforehand. There was no repetition of the dissension that had accompanied Juncker’s appointment.

Before Van Rompuy departs from the scene, it is worth pointing out that this is precisely what he is there for: to broker agreements between the members of the European Council, to prepare and direct the business.

Back in 2009, when Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton were appointed to their respective posts, things were less smoothly organised. Ashton was the surprise appointment of 2009 – the result of the centre-left’s failure to agree beforehand on candidates for the top jobs. This time round, there was not the same note of chance bordering on accident. Even if Mogherini’s candidacy was and is controversial – because of her alleged softness towards Russia, because of her brief experience in a ministerial post – it does not come with the same note of surprise that accompanied the choice of Ashton. The doubts about Mogherini were aired – and the risk is being taken knowingly.

Reflection on the past (2): Tusk is without comparable precedent.

When the role of permanent president of the European Council was created by the Lisbon treaty, there was much debate about whether the person appointed would become the embodiment and public face of the EU, about whether the president would prove to be a rival to national leaders, or become merely the poodle of the EU’s bigger member states. There were doubts about how the interests of the smaller member states would be safeguarded.

In the event, the European Council opted for Herman Van Rompuy, who was prime minister of Belgium, rather than for, say, Tony Blair or Felipe González.

This time round, the European Council has appointed as its president a serving prime minister from a large member state – a country that matters demographically, economically and militarily in Europe and that is a close ally of the United States.

Tusk has been an important figure on the world stage since his election as prime minister in 2007. He is arguably the person of highest standing ever appointed to head an EU institution. (Note that Romano Prodi was an ex-prime minister before he became Commission president. The prime ministerships of Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal do not compare.)

Declaration (2): Languages are not everything.

The most intriguing unknown about this two-pronged appointment is not how Mogherini will work out (the precedent of Ashton suggests that in a half-formed state EU foreign policy will muddle along, albeit unsatisfactorily). The fresher question is how the appointment of Tusk might change the presidency of the European Council, which, like the foreign policy role, is still in its adolescence.

The choice of Tusk has been accompanied by a preoccupation in Brussels with his linguistic skills (or lack of them) – a preoccupation, it has to be said, that appears to be shared by Tusk himself. The doubts about his ability in English (and inability in French) have even prompted some to suggest that Juncker might be given more opportunity to speak for the European Union.

At one level, the linguistic skills do matter (think of Romano Prodi’s communication failures as Commission president), but there is more to making a success of the presidency of the European Council than speaking several languages.

Tusk himself was at pains after his appointment to stress that he would be acting in the interests of all member states, and that his Polish background would be left behind. He stressed the need for the president to build compromises and rightly paid tribute to Van Rompuy as “a master” of such work.

If Tusk can combine his experience as a prime minister with this awareness of what the EU needs, and if he can exploit the respect that government leaders have for him (not least Angela Merkel), then he might set an intriguing precedent for leadership of an EU institution. (They have usually been charisma-free.)

Less than reckless prediction (2): The honeymoon is already over.

At this stage, what can only be guessed at is how to weigh Tusk’s stature against Mogherini’s comparative inexperience. There was much discussion beforehand of how the European Council could achieve a balanced ticket. Could its choice balance the politics of left and right? Could it satisfy east-west, north-south? And – as the Ukraine crisis intensified – would it be hard or soft on Russia?

The Tusk-Mogherini ticket is some kind of attempt to resolve these conundrums. According to one perspective, it might variously be described as a balancing act or a trade-off. But it is hard to overestimate the element of risk. One cynical interpretation of Saturday’s decision is that the Council has opted for the ticket that Vladimir Putin would have wished for: destabilising the government in Warsaw and appointing to the foreign policy role someone perceived as an appeaser.

The European Council has taken a calculated gamble. If Mogherini lives down to the expectations of her detractors, and if Tusk is a diminished figure outside Warsaw, then the gamble fails. The omens are hardly propitious. The two will take up office in the midst of Europe’s most important foreign policy crisis for many years – armed conflict in Ukraine – with the European economy threatening to nose-dive into a deflationary slump, and the United Kingdom heading towards an incendiary general election that could unleash another wave of Euroscepticism. The pair will not have an easy ride.